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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
KAREN ANDERSON FAHEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 8373 
WILBUR J. C. FAHEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by District 
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson awarding a divorce to plaintiff 
against the defendant. Plaintiff was awarded custody of the 
minor children of the parties and was also awarded the use 
of the home belonging to the plaintiff and defendant, the fur-
niture and fixtures therein and the automobile owned by the 
parties. The defendant resisted both the granting of the di-
vorce and the disposition of the property. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
It is difficult to make a concise yet fair statement of the 
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facts in this case because of the sharp conflict between the 
inferences and innuendos made by the plaintiff in her direct 
testimony and the admissions which she made on cross-exami-
nation. The testimony of the defendant is also at variance 
with the direct testimony of the plaintiff. However, because on 
appeal it is necessary for the Court to draw inferences from 
the evidence most favorable to the party prevailing below, 
counsel for the appellant will in this Statement of Fact, attempt 
to restrict the statement to the facts that can be gleaned from 
the testimony of the plaintiff on both direct and cross exami-
nation. However, only from a reading of the complete tran-
script in the case is it possible to gain an accurate picture of 
the circumstances under which this marriage began, existed 
and ended. 
In November of 1947 the plaintiff, then an unmarried 
woman, went on a Mission for the Latter-day Saints Church 
to the Hawaiian Islands (27). While there she experienced 
considerable difficulty in getting along with her associates, par-
ticular! y the Mission President, E. Wesley Smith ( 34) . 
The defendant, who was at the time not a member of the 
L.D.S. Church, was employed in the Hawaiian Islands as a 
radio technician (73). He was at the time a widower, his 
first wife having died in 1946, leaving a child, Susan, who 
in 1947 was approximately 6 years of age (74). The de-
fendant became interested in the L.D.S. Church and at the 
meetings held by the missionaries in the Hawaiian Islands 
which he attended, became acquainted with the plaintiff. Some-
time later at a ceremony attended by the plaintiff, the de-
fendant was baptized a member of the church (33). 
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The two became interested in one another and carried 
on a courtship mostly by letter ( 3 5). It appears that at no 
time during this courtship did they overstep the bounds of 
propriety in view of the ecclesiastical position of the plaintiff 
at the time. The two were married in the Hawaiian Islands 
on October 9, 1948, (2) the plaintiff having been granted 
a release from her Mission immediately before the marriage 
ceremony ( 34) . 
The plaintiff testified that she never did love the defend-
ant ( 34) but was forced into the marriage by the Mission 
president because he was irritated with her and wished to be 
rid of her as a missionary. She further testified that not having 
loved the defendant, she then proceeded to hate him from 
the day of the marriage on because of the fact that physical 
relationship with him was distasteful. Her testimony in this 
regard is as follows ( 3 7) : 
"From the first day after I married him, the way 
he physically and sexually treated me I hated him from 
that day on until this day." 
A short time before the marriage, the defendant had 
brought his daughter by his former marriage to the Hawaiia~ 
Islands ( 35). She had previously been residing with his mother 
in the United States. The couple lived on the Islands with 
the child Susan until April of 1949 when the defendant's con-
tract with Radio Corporation of America terminated, when 
they moved to Salt Lake City, where they made their home (73). 
For a short time they resided with the plaintiff's grand-
mother, but after some two months located and moved into an 
apartment of their own (75). The defendant at first had some 
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difficulty finding lucrative employment in Salt Lake City. 
In the Islands he had been earning approximately $600.00 per 
month. The first job which he secured. in Salt Lake City paid 
him only one-third of that amount (75). As a result he secured 
an additional job and worked a total of approximately 18 hours 
a day for a period of time (75-51). The plaintiff also se-
cured employment, which she retained up until the time their 
baby was born in 1954 (76). The defendant later secured a 
better job working as a full time employee of the Utah State 
National Guard (75) and the couple purchased themselves 
a home in Salt Lake City (76). 
At the beginning of the Korean War, the defendant was 
inducted into active service with the balance of the Utah Na-
tional Guard (76). He was first sent to a station in the State 
of Kansas where, after a period of some months, the plaintiff 
and the child Susan joined him (76). The plaintiff found em-
ployment in Kansas and stayed there on the job which she 
had after the defendant was sent overseas ( 77) . 
After the defendant's discharge from the service, both 
the plaintiff and the defendant and the child Susan returned 
to Salt Lake City where they moved into the home which they 
formerly purchased and which had been rented while they 
were away (77). They continued to reside in this home until 
a child was born to them on July 17, 1954. Within three weeks 
after the child was born, plaintiff left the defendant ( 83) and 
shortly thereafter instituted proceedings for divorce. 
During all the period of their married life the plaintiff 
handled the finances of both of the parties, she keeping her 
own earnings and he turning over to her his paycheck ( 36). 
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She would then pay the bills and would return to the defendant 
enough for him to pay his tithing and for his incidental spend-
ing money. She complained bitterly about the amount of money 
spent by the defendant. She complained because he spent 
money on his hobby, which was radio, in an amount varying 
between $5.00 and $2 5.00 per month (53). She complained 
because he spent $220.00 over a period of some one and one-
half years for flying lessons (52), which the defendant testified 
he regarded as desirable to improve his standing in his pro-
fession (79). She complained because on occasion the defend-
ant bought lunch for male friends ( 5 ~~), although the defend-
ant testified that these occasions were so few that he was em-
barrassed in light of like favors which he received from his 
associates at work ( 79). Plaintiff belittled the defendant be-
cause during the period prior to their marriage while he was 
working in Hawaii he had saved no money from his earnings 
(50). vet the evidence shows that while the defendant was 
overseas, the plaintiff, while receiving her own earnings, 
$140.00 a month allowance from the defendant's pay and 
$80.00 per month rental from their Salt Lake house, saved 
nothing at all and in fact partialfy dissipated a bank account 
of $500.00, which the defendant had established by borrowing 
shortly before he went overseas and had paid back, not out of 
the allotment to the plaintiff, but out of the small amount 
retained from his earnings (78) (Ex. 7). 
Plaintiff further complained that on two occasions, one 
in 1949 and one in 1950, the defendant struck her ( 30). How-
ever, she admitted that no such thing had occurred in the last 
four years of their married life together ( 31) . In regard to the 
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striking incidents, the defendant recalled one of them, but 
could not recall the other. In regard to the one he did recall, 
he described the circumstances under which it had occurred and 
the provocation therefor, and further testified that he was im-
mediately sorry and ashamed of what he had done, and the 
couple made up their differences the next day ( 85-86). 
Plaintiff further complained that the defendant at times, 
when his temper was aroused, would shout at her and the child 
Susan. Her principal complaint against him throughout, how-
ever, appears to have been that he would engage in sexual 
intercourse with her at times when she did not desire such 
association, and also that she felt he was unduly severe in 
his discipline of the child Susan, who subsequent to the marriage 
had been adopted by the plaintiff. 
In the year 195 3 ( 65) the plaintiff's mother, who had pre-
viously been residing in the State of Washington, returned 
to Salt Lake City to live. Her association with the couple ap-
pears to have been very close and from that time on the mar-
riage disintegrated rapidly (81-82). 
For a number of years after the marriage plaintiff had 
been unable to have children which she testified she wanted 
very badly ( 40). Although she claims that at the time she was 
constantly and consistently hating her husband, she submitted 
to a major operation and other less severe but rather extensive 
and painful treatments in an effort to establish her fertility 
( 41-42). She finally became pregnant and had a child on 
July 17, 1954. Shortly after the child was born, plaintiff went 
to her grandmother's house to stay for a short period and the 
plaintiff's mother came down to keep house for the defendant 
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and the child Susan ( 62) . One night while this arrangement 
was in progress, the defendant chastised Susan for disobeying 
him. The facts surrounding this incident are confused and the 
evidence conflicting, Mrs. Fahey's mother testifying that the 
defendant was unduly severe and slapped the child in the face 
leaving welts on her face ( 64). The defendant, on the other 
hand, described the incident as being a necessary chastisement 
for a child who, because of the unstable family life which she 
had experienced, was rebellious and in fact bordering on de-
linquency (84-85). At any rate the plaintiff's mother the next 
day reported the incident to the plaintiff, who was staying 
at her grandmother's house. The plaintiff thereupon filed suit 
for divorce and obtained a restraining order alleging that 
she feared that the defendant would do great bodily harm 
to herself, to the child Susan and to the baby. Notwithstanding 
this allegation two days later when she wanted to do some shop-
ping and to be relieved of the care of the baby, she voluntarily 
left him alone with the defendant for a full afternoon ( 46). 
Further facts will be hereinafter discussed in connection 
with the points to which they are applicable. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBITS 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 AND 15. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
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WAS CONFINED IN A SANITARIUM A SHORT TIME 
BEFORE THEIR MARRIAGE. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE 
DEFENDANT TO CALL DRS. HORNE AND KIRK TO 
TESTIFY REGARDING THE MENTAL ILLNESS OF THE 
PLAINTIFF, AND PRESIDENT E. WESLEY SMITH TO 
TESTIFY REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SUR-
ROUNDING THE MARRIAGE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIVORCE 
TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE REASON THAT THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A 
FINDING OF CRUELTY. 
POINT FIVE 
THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ORDERED BY THE 
COURT IS INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBITS 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 AND 15. 
The plaintiff testified that the marriage was entered into 
by her reluctantly largely because of the pressuring of the 
10 
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defendant and of President E. Wesley Smith of the Hawaiian 
Islands ( 34) . This matter is important because the court in 
comments made at the time the decision was rendered stated 
that the plaintiff was to some extent excused from her ad-
mittedly improper conduct during the marriage by the fact 
that the marriage got off to a bad start from the fact that there 
had been no normal courtship preceding it ( 98-99). The 
defendant's testimony was to the contrary to the effect that 
while the courtship was necessarily restrained because of the 
plaintiff's ecclesiastical position, there was definitely love and 
affection between the parties and the marriage was one which 
was as much or more of the plaintiff's making than anyone 
else (80). 
The defendant offered in evidence eleven letters written 
by the plaintiff to the defendant in the months immediately 
precedmg their marriage. These letters express in the most 
endearing terms the plaintiff's love for the defendant and her 
desire to become his wife. A reading of them could not help 
convince an impartial observer that the plaintiff's testimony 
as to the circumstances under which the marriage was entered 
into was absolutely false. The Court refused to accept these 
letters in evidence, stating at the time that it was immaterial 
to the case under what circumstances the marriage was entered 
into and that in any event the plaintiff's story as to the circum-
stances did not inure to her benefit. This is certainly inconsistent 
with the later statements of the court to the effect that the 
plainiff was, to some extent, excused from her breach of the 
marriage covenant by the fact that she had not entered into 
it under normal circumstances. 
11 
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POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS CONFINED IN A SANITARIUM A SHORT TIME 
BEFORE THEIR MARRIAGE. 
The defendant offered to prove that after being sent on 
her l\1ission to Hawaii and within the year preceding the mar-
riage, the plaintiff had quarreled violently with her missionary 
companions and as a result of one quarrel had become so 
emotionally upset that she was for a period of time confined 
to a mental sanitarium for mental treatment ( 28). This offer 
of proof was rejected by the Court. Such evidence appears clear-
ly to have been competent. The Court made the statement at 
the time he announced his findings that the emotional stability 
of the wronged party would be taken into consideration in 
determining whether or not the actions of the other party 
were sufficient to constitute cruelty. Certainly if this is true, 
then the corollary would be true that the amount of provocation 
and the problem with which the defendant had to deal should 
have been taken into consideration in determining whether or 
not the actions of the defendant were such as to warrant 
censor or blame on his part. While a husband should un-
doubtedly make certain allowances for any mental illness on 
the part of his wife and attempt to adjust himself to them, 
it is also true that a husband dealing with an emotionally un-
stable wife is presented with problems that a husband with 
a normal wifes does not have and he may have to do things 
in order to keep the marriage riding smoothly which would 
not be necessary where the wife is well adjusted mentally 
and emotionally. Rejection of this evidence was clear error. 
12 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE 
DEFENDANT TO CALL DRS. HORNE AND KIRK TO 
TESTIFY REGARDING THE MENTAL ILLNESS OF THE 
PLAINTIFF, AND PRESIDENT E. WESLEY SMITH TO 
TESTIFY REGARDING THE . CIRCUMSTANCES SUR-
ROUNDING THE MARRIAGE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT. 
The trial of the case moved more swiftly than counsel 
for the defendant had anticipated as there was no cross-exami-
nation at all of the defendant. Defendant had made arrange-
ments for two physicians to appear later in the afternoon to 
give testimony. When they were not there at the close of the 
examination of the defendant, defendant's counsel request-
ed a short recess in order to get them there ( 89) . The 
Court denied this continuance, not on the ground that time 
was a factor because it was then only midafternoon and the 
Court had no other matters scheduled for that day, but on 
the ground that the testimony of the doctors would be im-
material ( 92). 
As was shown in the statement which constituted an offer 
of proof as to what the doctors would testify, the defendant 
would have shown by these doctors that the plaintiff had twice 
attempted suicide. Once while plaintiff and defendant were 
residing together and the second time after the defendant had 
left for army duty and the plaintiff had not even seen him 
for a period of two months. The plaintiff on cross-examination 
had admitted certain facts surrounding the two instances to 
13 
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which the doctors would have testified, but denied that there 
was any suicidal intent at either time. The doctors would have 
testified that the intention to commit suicide had been ex-
pressed to them by the defendant. The court held that this 
was immaterial. It is the position of the defendant that this 
testimony was highly material as set forth in the argument 
under the preceding point. 
Defendant was also prepared to call President E. Wesley 
Smith of the Hawaiian Islands for the purpose of refuting 
the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the circumstances under 
which the marriage had taken place. The defendant felt and 
still feels that this testimony was relevant and for the reasons 
set forth in the argument under Point One. The Court, how-
ever, held that President Smith's testimony would be of no 
value and refused to allow the defendant to call him. These 
actions on the part of the Court constituted obvious error 
to the prejudice of the defendant. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIVORCE 
TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE REASON THAT THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A 
FINDING OF CRUELTY. 
This case presents for determination three questions: 
(a) Is incompatibility grounds for a divorce in the 
State of Utah? 
(b) Can a person secure a divorce merely because he 
no longer loves his spouse and wishes to be di-
vorced? 
14 
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(c) May a person by their own misconduct deliberately 
goad the other party to a marriage to excesses of 
language or conduct and then assign such excesses 
as cause for divorce? 
The Trial Court is of the opinion that this Court by 
judicial legislation has made incompatibility grounds for 
divorce in this state, and stated so clearly during discussion 
with counsel at the time the Court was announcing its decision 
(93). The Court went on to say, "I was surprised at that 
case" (96). The Court nevertheless proceeded to grant the 
divorce merely because plaintiff wanted it and testified that 
she did not love the aefendant, could not get along with him 
and desired to be divorced. Although the Trial Court did not 
identify by name the case on which reliance was placed, refer-
ence was evidently made to the case of Hendricks v. Hendricks, 
____ Ut. ____ , 257, Pac. (2d) 366. Counsel does not understand 
that this Court in the Hendricks case decided any such thing 
as Judge Jeppson apparently felt was decided. The Court did 
not in the Hendricks case decide that incompatibility was 
grounds for divorce, but rather held that recrimination is not 
necessarily a defense to a divorce action. In the Hendricks 
case, both parties were seeking the divorce, neither one wanted 
to continue the marriage relationship, both of them wanted 
to rid themselves of the rights and obligations which had been 
acquired by the marriage ceremony. Both of them were guilty 
of conduct against the other which would constitute, under 
the statutes of the State of Utah, grounds for divorce. The only 
question there involved was whether or not when grounds for 
divorce exist on each side where both parties wanted a divorce, 
the Court itself should determine as a matter of public policy 
15 
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that it should grant no divorce at all. The Court determined 
that it would not refuse to grant a divorce under such circum-
stances, that where grounds for divorce existed public policy 
did not require two people to live together where both of 
them were struggling to rid themselves of the marriage. In 
this case we have no such situation. In this case we have the 
party guilty of the greater wrong, the party guilty of the grounds 
for divorce, if there were any, attempting to secure a divorce 
from the wronged party, who, in spite of the situation that 
prevailed desired to effect a reconciliation and continue the 
marriage relationship. To permit a divorce under such circum-
stances would be to make a sham of the marriage contract 
and to permit a person to be relieved thereof because of her 
own wrong and not because of the wrong of the other party. 
The Trial Court recognized, as would have to be recog-
nized by any impartial observer, that whatever intemperence 
of speech or conduct defendant might have exhibited, resulted 
directly from the abuses which he had accepted from the plain-
tiff. The Court stated (97-98): 
"Now if you get a neurotic person, it is almost im-
possible to live harmoniously with them. * * * Now 
because it is hard, the person is driven to conduct 
which would justify a divorce. They do not realize that 
the neurotic condition is the basis, and they don't have 
the sympathy. It is pretty hard to do it. We cannot 
always administer what these doctors call a therapy 
that would help a nervous person. They get irritated 
instead. I would and you would, we all do." 
He went on to say on page 106: 
"There are things the plaintiff ought to consider in 
this case, and that is, that where you are overly sen-
16 
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sthve and nervous, it makes it very difficult for the 
persons around you to get along, where they are not 
skilled in that :field, and they just have to talk the way 
they feel." 
He further stated on page 105 of the record: 
"In the ordinary families the amount of cruelty 
they had in this case, should and could be overruled." 
(the word "overruled" appears to be a typographical error 
and should read "overlooked.") 
In determining where the fault lay, the Court said (Tr. 96): 
"The Court does not say it is all on one side, it 
might be just about even." 
The statement of the Court that the fault is just about even 
does not appear to be borne out by the evidence, even taken 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It is true that she 
testified that the defendant had struck her on two occasions, 
but after that she continued to live with him as his wife for 
some four years without a repetition of the offense and cer-
tainly those actions, even though the evidence discloses con-
siderable provocation therefor, were completely condoned. If 
we are to believe, at face value, the testimony of the plaintiff as 
given in this case, the situation is this: We have a woman 
who did not ·want a husband, but who wanted a family. She 
became acquainted with a widower, who already had a child 
that she desired to have as her own. Then, although she did 
not love the man she married him. Sexual relationship was 
distasteful to her. After the first sex act, her indifference turned 
to hate. Notwithstanding that she went along with the sham 
of the marriage until she had adopted the child. Then, not 
satisfied with that, desiring to be a natural mother, she con-
17 
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tinued to live in a marriage relationship with a man she hated, 
undergoing extensive medical and surgical treatment to make 
herself fertile. She continued with this sham until she con-
ceived and bore a child. Then, having what she had wanted 
in the first place from the marriage relationship, she seeks to 
cast aside the man who made it possible, cutting him off from 
normal relationship, not only with his wife, whom he testified 
he still loved in spite of what had happened, but also from 
his natural children whom as a father he naturally loved. 
It is the position of the defendant that this is not a true 
picture of what gave rise to the difficulties in this marriage. 
The evidence is unmistakable that the plaintiff is a highly 
neurotic woman and that the defendant had a great deal to 
put up with. It may well be that the mental condition of the 
plaintiff caused Mr. Fahey considerable aggravation at times; 
however, the evidence in the record, as well as the exhibits 
that were offered and refused, establish that Mrs. Fahey did 
love her husband at the time she married him and did continue 
to love him until the time that her mother came down to live 
near the couple. Exhibit 4, which was received in evidence, is 
a letter written some five years after the marriage in which she 
still expressed her love for her husband, and Exhibit 5 was 
written only about one year before the divorce action. The 
rather subtle hand of the plaintiff's mother is plainly evident 
in the disruption of this marriage. It was not until she came 
to Salt Lake that the trouble became really serious. It was 
she who carried the details of the alleged abuse of Susan which 
allegedly lead to the final break, and it was she who thwarted 
all attempts at reconciliation. 
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The defendant appealed to the authorities of the Church 
to which they both belonged in an effort to bring about a 
reconciliation. Exhibit 16, which was offered but rejected, is 
evidence of these attempts. At his instigation, Pres. Joseph 
Fielding Smith called a meeting between the parties. However, 
when the plaintiff appeared, rather than appearing alone, she 
appeared with her mother, who proceeded to scuttle all attempts 
at reconciliation. The mother testified that she went to this 
meeting at the request of her daughter (70). The plaintiff, 
on the other hand, previously testified, while the mother was 
excluded from the court room, that she did not request her 
mother to go, but that it was her mother's own idea to go 
along ( 160). 
This is not an irreconcilable cleft; it is one which would 
be readily reconciled if this divorce were denied and the parties 
left to their own devices rather than subject to the pressure 
of an overly-possessive mother of one of the parties. Certainly 
public policy does not require the granting of a divorce on 
sham or even on very slim grounds in a situation such as this. 
The public policy in this regard was very well set forth 
by this Court in Cordner v. Cordner, 94 Ut. 466, 61 Pac. (2d) 
601, in the following words: 
"The marriage covenant creates a status not lightly 
to be regarded. It is presumed that before a man and 
a woman marry they have wisely, carefully, discreetly, 
and reverently considered the matter. The institution 
of marriage is a sacred one protected by the law, fos-
tered by religion, and maintained and encouraged by 
organized society. Once entered into, good cause for 
separation must be alleged and proved before the cove-
nant may be set aside." 
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In the case of Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Ut. 580; 245 Pac. 
335, the Court set aside a Decree of Divorce holding: "We 
think the evidence of the wife's conduct in this case fails to 
establish legal cruelty." The Court then went on to quote 
from the case of Doe v. Doe, 158 Pac. 781, 48 Ut. 200, to the 
effect that the courts would grant a divorce for cruelty to a 
wife in much less aggravated cases than would be required 
to grant a husband a divorce from the wife. This perhaps is 
sound policy although the reasoning behind it has been some-
what tempered since that time by the emancipated social 
status of women. However, even so, this Court or any other 
Court having cruelty as grounds for divorce has never gone 
so far as to say that a wife may secure a divorce under cir-
cumstances where her husband's conduct is nothing more than 
the normal and natural conduct of the man to misconduct on 
the part of the wife. 
In the case of Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 184 Pac. (2d) 
670, the husband sought a divorce from his wife on the 
grounds of constant quarreling and bickering. The Court did 
sustain the Decree awarded to the husband in that case, but 
stated: 
"If these parties were younger, we might hesitate 
to sustain the decree. However, in this case both par-
ties are over 70. They are rapidly approaching the time 
when they will be solely dependent physically as well 
as financially. Acts and remarks which would usually 
not irritate people much younger, have annoyed these 
people because of ill-health and difficulties in hearing. 
Their inability to adjust, their lack of cooperation, their 
old-age and utter financial dependency, have tended 
to magnify the irritation over the conduct of each 
other." 
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Here we have no such situation. Here we have a couple 
in their thirties, still bearing children. The couple was getting 
along well financially. As the trial judge pointed out, such 
conduct as is here at issue should be overlooked. The de-
fendant since the couple separated has shown every desire 
to reconcile. He has made efforts which without doubt, if not 
interferred with by the mother-in-law, would have been suc-
cessful. Good public policy demands that the Court here rec-
ognize the sanctity of the marriage contract by refusing a 
divorce and by leaving the couple to work out their problems 
in a more natural way. Under the circumstances, if the Decree 
were affirmed the defendant would be punished for something 
that was not his fault. The Court would, thereby, be further-
ing the designs and schemes of an overly possessive woman, 
who, having lost her husband and having only recently mar-
ried a man much older, attempts to grasp at her daughter and 
her daughter's family by systematically brain-washing them 
against their husband and father. 
POINT FIVE 
THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ORDERED BY THE 
COURT IS INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST. 
The Court in effect awarded to the plaintiff in this case 
all of the property which the plaintiff and defendant had ac-
quired over the years of their married life. The defendant 
did not at the trial and does not now complain about the 
amount of support money. So long as the children are living 
with the mother alone and dependant upon her for support, 
he feels that the amount is fair and reasonable as he wants the 
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children well taken care of. However, he does complain of 
the fact that he salvaged nothing out of the marriage. The 
automobile was awarded to the plaintiff; all of the furniture 
in the home, with the exception of a small equity in a deep-
freeze, was awarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded 
the right to live in the home in which the couple had approxi-
mately a $5000.00 equity. It is true that the Court stated that 
if the property were ever sold the defendant should receive 
one-half of the equity realized, provided, however, that the 
plaintiff should first be paid back all payments which she made 
on the property including interest, and interest on the interest. 
It is evident, therefore, that any award to the defendant in 
that case is an illusory as his equity would be entirely consumed 
in a period of two or three years by this provision. 
As the matter stands, he is left without a home, without 
property, without a wife and with his children being weaned 
away from him by a mother-in-law who has already succeeded 
in wrecking his marriage. Certainly a Court of equity cannot 
sanction this situation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
721 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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